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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Roberto Moran-Soto appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver. Specifically, he contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the methamphetamine officers found in his pockets. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedincts 
Sergeant Hoadley and Officer Hemmert entered a Caldwell bar looking for 
two fugitive individuals who were known to frequent that location. (SH Tr., p.8, 
Ls.13-22; p.32, L.20 - p.33, ~.2. ')  The officers did not locate the fugitives, but 
did observe Roberto Moran-Soto and David Castro sitting next to each other at 
the bar. (SH Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.16. L.8; p.33, L.3 - p.34, L.6.) Sergeant Hoadley 
saw Castro push a napkin away from himself onto the bartender's lower side of 
the bar. (SH Tr., p.33, Ls.10-16.) Officer Hemmert saw plastic hanging out of 
the crumpled napkin. (SH Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.lO.) He opened the napkin, and 
found two plastic baggies with a crystal substance inside that he believed to be 
methamphetamine or cocaine. (SH Tr., p.9, L.15 - p.13, L.7.) Officer Hemmert 
detained both Castro and the bartender, but not Moran-Soto, with handcuffs. 
(SH Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.3.) Castro told Sergeant Hoadley that Moran-Soto 
was attempting to sell him methamphetamine at the bar. (SH Tr., p.57, Ls.7-19.) 
Sergeant Hoadley then asked Moran-Soto, in English, for identification, 
which Moran-Soto provided. (SH Tr., p.46, Ls.5-19.) Sergeant Hoadley also 
1 "SH Tr." refers to the suppression hearing transcript, which includes both the 
11/6/08 and 11/13/08 hearings, with pages consecutively numbered. 
asked Moran-Soto if he had anything illegal on him. (SH Tr., p.47, Ls.9-23.) 
Moran-Soto responded, in English, that he did not, and told the officer he could 
"check." (SH Tr., p.48, Ls.1-7.) Sergeant Hoadley, wary of reaching into Moran- 
Soto's pockets due to the possibility of needles being present, asked Moran-Soto 
to empty his pockets, which he did. (SH Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) Sergeant Hoadley 
asked Moran-Soto if he "had anything else" and Moran-Soto raised his arm, and 
again said, "check." (SH Tr., p.48, L.24 - p.49, L.3.) Sergeant Hoadley reached 
into Moran-Soto's pocket and found a plastic bindle which appeared to 
Seargeant Hoadley to contain methamphetamine. (SH Tr., p.48, L.24 - p.49, 
L.24.) Moran-Soto was arrested, Mirandized, and charged with possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (SH Tr., p.51, L.15 - p.54, L.12; R., 
pp.20-21.) 
Moran-Soto filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, and his 
statements admitting ownership of the methamphetamine made after his arrest. 
(R., pp.24-25.) After a hearing, the district court granted his motion with regard 
to his statements, concluding that the Miranda warnings given to Moran-Soto 
were not communicated in a fashion that could be clearly understood, given 
Moran-Soto's limited understanding of English. (SH Tr., p.123, L.6 - p.124, 
L.23.) However, the district court denied the motion with regard to the 
methamphetamine found in Moran-Soto's pockets, concluding that Moran-Soto 
did speak some English, and that his verbal and non-verbal responses to 
Sergeant Hoadley's requests exhibited voluntary consent to search his person. 
(SHTr.,p.121,Ls.16-22;p.124,L.24-p.125,L.21.) 
Moran-Soto entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver, preserving his right to appeal the district court's 
ruling in the motion to suppress. (R., pp.48-49.) The court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Moran-Soto on probation. (R., pp.53-57.) He was subsequently 
deported2 (R., p.77). but filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.63-66.) 
On December 22, 2009, the state filed a motion to dismiss Moran-Soto's appeal 
due to his deportation and subsequent absconding from probation for failing to 
contact the probation and parole office. As of this writing, he has an active 
probation violation warrant for his arrest. 
Moran-Soto states the issue on appeal as: 
In light of the State's failure to meet its burden of showing 
that Mr. Moran-Soto voluntarily consented to the search of his 
person or that the item removed from Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket 
would have been inevitably discovered by officers, did the district 
court err when it denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to suppress the 
item removed from his pocket? 
(Appeilant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Moran-Soto failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
Moran-Soto Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denvina His 
Motion To Sup~ress 
A. Introduction 
Moran-Soto argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the methamphetamine found in his pockets during his encounter with 
police officers. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-17.) Moran-Soto's claim is without merit. 
The district court correctly determined that Moran-Soto gave the officer voluntary 
consent to search his pockets, and in any event, the inevitable discovery doctrine 
would have precluded suppression of the methamphetamine. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 ldaho 728,729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in 
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 ldaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That Moran-Soto's Consent To Search His Pockets Was Voluntary 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Varie, 135 ldaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 
(2001). The state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance 
of the evidence. State v. Ballou, 145 ldaho 840, 846, 186 P.3d 696, 702 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of the 
totality of the circumstances. State v. Baxter, 144 ldaho 672,681, 168 P.3d 1019 
(Ct. App. 2007). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or 
coercion, either direct or implied. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248. Consent may be 
voluntarily given during an investigative detention. State v. Holcomb, 128 ldaho 
296,301-303,912 P.2d 664,669-671 (Ct. App. 1995). Consent to search can be 
communicated through "words, gesture, or conduct." State v. Knauu, 120 ldaho 
343,348,815 P.2d 1083,1088 (Ct. App. 1991). 
In properly analyzing the totality of the circumstances in this case, the 
district court concluded that the state had met its burden of establishing that 
Moran-Soto gave voluntary consent to the officers to search his pockets. (SH Tr., 
p.124, L.24 - p.125, L.21.) This finding is supported by the record. 
Moran-Soto's voluntarily-given consent to search was evidenced by 
words, gestures, and conduct. When Sergeant Hoadley asked Moran-Soto if he 
had anything illegal on him, Moran-Soto provided verbal consent by telling the 
officer to "check, after responding that he did not possess anything illegal, all in 
English. (SH Tr., p.47, L.7 - p.48, L.8.) Moran-Soto also provided consent 
through his conduct when he emptied the contents of his pockets onto the bar. 
(SH Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) Moran-Soto finally provided consent through a gesture, 
when he raised his arm and said "check after the officer asked him whether he 
had "anything else." (SH Tr., p.48, L.23 - p.49, L.3.) 
The district court also properly considered Moran-Soto's apparent 
limitations in speaking English. The court distinguished between Miranda 
warnings, which contain "a complicated level of items," and the communications 
between the officers and Moran-Soto regarding consent, which was a more 
"simplified conversation about emptying your pockets." (SH Tr., p.123, L.6 - 
p.124, L.23.) Utilizing this distinction, and its evaluation of the testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court concluded that it could not 
find that Moran-Soto was properly administered Miranda warnings in a way he 
could understand them, but that his limited English did allow him to communicate 
with officers and give voluntary consent to search his pockets. (SH Tr., p.120, 
L.18 - p.126, L.7.) 
Moran-Soto contends that any consent he gave was the product of police 
coercion. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-12.) In support of this proposition, Moran-Soto 
highlights elements of the encounter that he alleges evidences the coercion of 
the  officer^.^ (Appellant's brief, p.1 I . )  In a totality of the circumstances analysis 
however. none of these elements overcome Moran-Soto's clear verbal and non- 
verbal voluntary consent. Several of the elements, in fact, are merely incidental 
occurrences of an encounter with police, such as the fact that the officers were 
uniformed, and carrying badges and guns. While such facts can be considered 
in a totality of the circumstances analysis, they do not in this instance bring into 
doubt the voluntary consent offered by Moran-Soto, or the district court's denial 
of the motion to suppress. 
The district court correctly concluded that Moran-Soto's consent was 
voluntary, given the totality of the circumstances. Moran-Soto has failed to show 
error in the court's determination. This Court should uphold Moran-Soto's 
conviction and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine found in his pockets. 
D. Even If The District Court Erred In Determininq Moran-Soto's Consent 
Was Voluntarv, Suppression Was Precluded Bv The Inevitable Discovery 
Doctrine 
While concluding that the state had met its burden in proving that Moran- 
Soto's consent to search his person was voluntarily given, the district court also 
Moran-Soto contends that his consent was coerced by: (1) the fact that the 
police officers were uniformed, and wearing both badges and guns (though their 
guns were never drawn (SH Tr., p.58, Ls.5-8)). (2) prior to the search of Moran- 
Soto, Officer Hemmert had ordered everyone "to stay where they are" (the district 
court found, and Moran-Soto does not dispute, that the investigatory detentions 
of Moran-Soto, Castro, and the bartender were all lawful) (Tr., p.119, L.23 - 
p.120, L.6.); (3) after receiving Moran-Soto's identification card, Sergeant 
Hoadley placed it back down on the bar rather than returning it to Moran-Soto; 
and (4) Moran-Soto had witnessed the bartender resisting detention, and the 
subsequent physical altercation between the bartender and the officers. 
(Appellant's brief, p.1 I .) 
recognized that even if the state hadn't met this burden, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine precluded the suppression of the methamphetamine. (SH Tr., p.126, L.8 
- p.127, L.17.) 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule. 
See State v. Buterbau~h, 138 ldaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct. App. -
2002). Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof that the 
evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means, then 
exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by 
constitutionally improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); 
Stuart v. State, 136 ldaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). The 
underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution 
in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a 
worse one. Nk, 467 U.S. at 442-44; see also Buterbauah, 138 ldaho at 102, 57 
1. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Ap~lies To The 
Methamphetamine Found In Moran-Soto's Pockets 
In Buterbauah, police and firefighters conducted a lawful warrantless 
search of a basement. a. at 98-100. During this lawful search, they uncovered 
evidence that would have been sufficient to obtain a valid search warrant for the 
remainder of the residence. a. at 101-103. Before the warrant was obtained, 
however, a firefighter unlawfully searched the upstairs rooms of the house, and 
discovered more evidence, which was subsequently reported to police, who 
seized it. @. at 98-101. The police then obtained a valid search warrant to 
search the entire house. a. at 101. The ldaho Court of Appeals found that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the evidence found upstairs, because by 
the time of the unlawful upstairs search, the officers had already lawfully obtained 
enough evidence for the valid search warrant that was eventually obtained, and 
had actually presented that lawfully obtained evidence to the magistrate in 
seeking the warrant. a. at 101-103. This valid warrant would have inevitably 
yielded the upstairs evidence that was unlawfully seized. a. Further, exclusion 
of the evidence would have placed the state in a worse position that it would 
have occupied without the constitutional violation, because it would have negated 
a valid warrant. a. 
Similarly, in the present case, the officers had already obtained probable 
cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to their search of him. (See argument infra.) 
Rather then arresting Moran-Soto at that point, which they were entitled to do, 
and which would have inevitably yielded the metha~n~hetamine.~ they continued 
the investigation and sought consent from Moran-Soto to search him. If that 
consent was not voluntary, then the inevitable discovery doctrine must apply, 
because, as in Butterbauah, exclusion of the evidence would place the state in a 
worse position than it would have occupied without the constitutional violation, 
because it would have negated the validly obtained probable cause to arrest. 
Rather than Buterbauqh, Moran-Soto instead relies on State v. Bunting, 
142 ldaho 908, 136 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2006). (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) He 
contends that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to this case 
A search incident to arrest is a well established exception to the warrant 
reauirement and, as such, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v. 
~aiifornia, 395 "s. 752, 762-63 (1969); State v. Kerley, 134 ldaho 870, 874, 11 
P.3d 489,493 (Ct. App. 2000). 
because that doctrine "is not based upon what an officer could or should do, but 
rather upon what is actually happening," and there was no evidence that the 
officers in this case were contemplating an arrest of Moran-Soto at the time he 
was searched. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) 
In Buntinq, the officers, as in Buterbaunh, had obtained evidence both 
from a lawful initial search, and an unlawful subsequent search. Buntinq, 142 
Idaho at 915-917, 126 P.3d at 386-388. The officers later obtained a search 
warrant, but failed to present much of the lawfully obtained evidence to the 
magistrate. !cj. Instead, they relied largely on the evidence that was later 
determined to be unlawfully obtained. !cj. The Court of Appeals held that when 
the unlawfully obtained evidence was excised from the total evidence that the 
officers actually presented to the magistrate, the remaining lawfully obtained 
evidence was insufficient to constitute probable cause for the search warrant. Id. 
Thus, the Court held, the warrant was invalid, and the inevitable discovery 
doctrine did not apply to the unlawfully obtained evidence. Id. Further, the 
exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence did not put the state in a worse 
position than it was in without the constitutional violation, since the officers never 
obtained a valid search warrant. Id. In so holding, the Court described the scope 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine as follows: 
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
is that a preponderance of the evidence proves that some action 
that actually took place, or was in the process of taking place, 
would have led to the discovery of the evidence that was already 
obtained through unlawful police action. The inevitable discovery 
doctrine was not intended to allow a court to consider what actions 
the authorities should or could have taken and in doing so then 
determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully obtained 
evidence would have been inevitable. 
Id. at 916-917. Unlike w, or the cases cited therein (United States v. -
Reilly, 234 F.3d 986, 995 (gth Cir. 2000); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 
P.2d 493 (1985)). but as in Buterbauah, the action that would have led to the 
discovery of the methamphetamine found on Moran-Soto's person was already in 
the process of taking place before the search. Prior to the discovery of the 
methamphetamine, Moran-Soto had already been subject to a lawful 
investigative detention, and the officer had already acquired probable cause to 
arrest him. Thus, the district court was not required to consider "what actions the 
authorities should or could have taken," because unlike in Bunting, the lawful 
actions actually taken by the officers (observing the drugs on the bar, 
interviewing Castro), were already sufficient to lawfully obtain the 
methamphetamine in Moran-Soto's pockets, pursuant to a search incident to 
arrest. 
Thus, the district court correctly determined that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine applied to the methamphetamine. 
2. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Officers Had 
Probable Cause To Arrest Moran-Soto Prior To Their Search Of 
Him 
Moran-Soto contends that even if the inevitable discovery doctrine could 
apply, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto until the 
methamphetamine was found on his person, and thus, no lawful arrest that would 
have yielded the methamphetamine was ineiitable. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) 
The district court, however, properly recognized that that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to the search. (SH Tr., p.126, L.12 - 
The standards for probable cause underlying an arrest were set forth in 
State v. Kvsar, 116 Idaho 992,783 P.2d 859 (1989): 
Reasonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the 
officer possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary 
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion that the person arrested is guilty. In evaluating a police 
officer's determination of probable cause in the field, a court must 
take into account "the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act." In determining whether there is probable cause 
for an arrest an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences 
from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has 
gained from his previous experience and training. 
Id. at 993, 783 P.2d at 860 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to 
their search of him.5 As the district court explained: 
Here's what the officer had. The drugs on the bar closer to 
Mr. - I thought one of the officers testified it was kind of between 
the defendant and Mr. Castro, but I think the sum and substance it 
was over more by Mr. Castro, and he's the one that pushed it 
across the bar. 
In determining that the officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior 
to their search of him, the district court refers to "statements by those individuals 
that the defendant was trying to sell drugs." (SH Tr., p.126, L.24 - p.127, L.1.) 
On appeal, Moran-Soto contends that this was a clearly erroneous factual 
finding, since the record indicates that only one individual, Castro, told the 
officers that Moran-Soto was attempting to sell drugs at the bar. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.14-15.) While there is no evidence in the record that this was anything 
more than a misstatement by the court (the court later specifically referred to only 
Castro giving the information (SH Tr., p.123, Ls.2-4)), or that the district court's 
decision hinged on the number of informants, the state agrees that this Court 
should disregard any "factual finding" that the bartender provided information to 
the officers. 
Certainly when the Officer Hemmert went behind the bar, the 
reasonable conclusions were when he discovered they were drugs 
that it was either the bartender or Mr. Castro had the drugs. And I 
think that was a fair agreement, and that they didn't conclude the 
defendant had the drugs. 
It's then accompanied by statements by those individuals 
that the defendant was trying to sell drugs. That is sufficient 
enough probable cause for an officer to make a determination to 
arrest. 
(SHTr., p.126, L.12-p.127,L.3.) 
The officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto before the search of 
his person. That justified a search incident to arrest, and the discovery of the 
methamphetamine found in Moran-Soto's pocket thus falls under the inevitable 
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. 
E. The Officers' Search of Moran-Soto Was A Pro~er  Search Incident To 
Arrest 
Finally, even if the district court's inevitable discovery analysis was 
incorrect, Moran-Soto's claim must still fail because the officers were allowed to 
search Moran-Soto incident to his subsequent arrest. If there is probable cause 
to arrest a suspect, a search, even in the absence of an arrest that precedes the 
search, may be considered a valid search incident to arrest. State v. Schwarz, 
133 ldaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999) (because officer had probable 
cause to arrest Schwarz, officer's pat down search was a valid search incident to 
arrest); State V. Kerley, 134 ldaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(search incident to arrest is exception to warrant requirement that may be 
submitted as alternative theory to justify pat down). Thus, because the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto, Moran-Soto cannot claim the less 
intrusive search was constitutionally prohibited. See State v. Schwarz, 133 ldaho 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Moran-Soto's 
conviction and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2010. 
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